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Abstract 
 
Keynesian Theory emphasizes on Government spending to revive a stagnant or 
decelerating economy. This fiscal policy was practised by many countries negatively 
impacted by economic downturns. This move , though , has a certain degree of 
limitations, as the Government need to realize longer term solutions are need for its 
budget deficits, if any. Nonetheless, such measures are proven, time and again to be 
effective in revive the stagnating economy. This paper is thus to examine, from the 
Malaysian context, the success or otherwise, of such strategy with analysis using 
trends and descriptive readings from statistical data from BNM and IMF. 
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1.0 OVERVIEW 
 
I believe by now, most of us are aware, the global credit crunch is full blown with 
severe impact to the world economies and The United States, the largest economy, 
already confirmed to be in recession. Other countries in such predicament are UK, 
Italy, Germany, & Ireland. Closer to home, we have Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan 
and New Zealand suffering the same fate.  
 
      This paper is not to deal with the reasons or causes as to why the Financial Crisis 
happen, but rather the strategies that the Government has put into place to minimise 
the effects of the global slowdown of the country’s main trading partners. Malaysia’s 
trade with the top 10 nations constitute about 70.7% of the country’s exports. The 10 
countries are : US, Japan, China, Singapore, Thailand, Korea, Germany, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Indonesia. 
 
      Therefore, to counter the negative effects of the slowdown, and maintain 
economic growth , it is pertinent that Malaysia proceeds swiftly with the various 
strategic measures. As with normal cycle, the impact will be felt after a time lag of 3 
to 6 months i.e. as Malaysia enters 1st Qtr 2009.. As it is, the country is ranked top 20 
in terms of its exports, and our export figures are rapidly decelerating. 
   
BNM’s figures for Sept’08 and Oct ’08 show the following :- 
 
__________________Sept’08________ Oct’08________  
 
Exports  RM62.3 billion RM54.8 billion 
 
Imports  RM47.5 billion RM43.8 billion 
 
 
      Exports registered a double digit decline of 12% m-to-m. However, imports 
recorded a smaller decline of 1%, indicating a cautious business approach. At this 
stage, data of Nov’08  is  yet to be released , and one can only make a guess at the 
performance. The pattern is unlikely to be very far off. 
Economic stimulus packages are fiscal tools used to create and speed up economic 
activities in a slowdown due to the onslaught of severe macro-economic events, 
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mostly external. In this paper, I shall deal with the outcomes of such economic 
stimulus packages implemented in the Malaysian context. The findings are based on 
IMF and Bank Negara Malaysia’s statistics . I shall look at  
 
(1) 1997/1998  - Asian Currency Crisis 
 
(2) 2001/2002  - US Recession 
 
      These 2 crisis periods were chosen as they were within a 10/11 year time frame.  
In 1998, Malaysia’s GDP figures were in negative territory whilst in Yr 2001, it only 
registered  GDP growth of 0.5% compared to an average of  7% to 8% in the  
preceding years prior to 1998. 
 
      The scope of coverage will thus be an analysis of the above 2 periods of economic 
upheavals and the fiscal stimulus measures implemented. After outlining brief details 
of the stimulus packages, I shall examine the data of subsequent years to ascertain 
their effectiveness. 
 
      Of course, we also had recession in 1985/1986. However, I shall exclude these as 
they were way too long and circumstances were different then. Having said that, I 
also wish to state that economic conditions especially macro-economic forces of 
1997/1998 and today’s are very much different. Besides, with today’s rapid 
globalization, the operating environment is more complex and sophisticated. We have 
many new financial products termed derivatives which is marketed all over the world. 
 
 
2.0 PAST STIMULUS PACKAGES :  
 
I shall now outline the stimulus packages implemented during the 2 periods of 
economic downturns. 
 
  
3 
2.1 Years 1997/1998 
 
To restore economic growth, in the fiscal stimulus, an allocation of RM7 billion was 
injected into development expenditure. The funds were distributed  as follows:- 
 
RM350 million - Agriculture 
 
RM200 million - Housing 
 
RM1.5 billion  - Infrastructure & public amenities 
RM1.0 billion  - Education 
 
RM 200 million - Industrial Development 
 
RM200 million - Rural Development 
 
RM300 million - Health 
 
RM300 million - Poverty eradication 
 
RM650 million - Cyberview 
 
RM2.2 billion  - Dana Pengurusan Harta 
 
 Year 1998 witnessed Malaysia did the unorthodox method of pegging the RM 
against the USD at RM3-80.Initially this move was widely criticized, but 
subsequently, economists felt that this was indeed the right medicine. Of course we 
shall not debate on this policy as it is not within the ambit of this paper.   
 
2.2 Year 2001 
 
Initial fiscal stimulus of RM3 billion in March with another RM4.3 billion  (in Sept) 
were announced for new projects :- 
 
RM2 billion - 200 single session schools under Phase II 
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RM0.9 billion - 193 community colleges in all Parliamentary constituencies, 
with 11 to be immediate 
 
RM1.6 billion - 4 Universities located in Melaka, Negeri Sembilan, Perlis and 
Pahang 
 
RM1.5 billion - 6,600 housing units for Malaysian Armed Forces in Kuala 
Lumpur 
 
RM0.6 billion - Oil palm replanting subsidies & special assistance to rubber 
plantation smallholders 
 
 A host of other measures were also implemented. One of the key strategy was 
to drive domestic demand to counter the slowdown. Other measures to promote 
greater consumption, financing of SMEs and services sector, include various funding 
schemes,  & reduction of employee’s EPF contributions. 
 
3.0 STATISTICS  
 
3.1    GDP ; INTERNATIONAL RESERVES ; FDI FROM 1996 TO 2007 
 
              Net FDI 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
GDP 
(%) 
 
 
International 
Reserves 
(RM billion) 
 
 
Retained Imports  
(Months) 
RM 
(billion) 
(Percentage 
of GDP) 
1996 10.0 70.0  4.4 14.4  
 
6.6 (Av) 
1997 7.3 59.0  3.4 19.2  
 
6.6 (Av) 
 
1998 (7.4) 99.4  5.7 10.6  
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1999 6.1 117.2  5.9 13.4  
 
4.9 (Av) 
 
2000 8.9 113.5  4.5 14.7  
 
4.9 (Av) 
 
2001 0.5 117.2  5.2 2.1  
 
1.0 
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2002 5.4 131.4  5.3 12.2  
 
3.6 
 
2003 5.8 170.5  7.8 9.4  
 
2.5 
 
2004 6.8 253.5  8.6 17.9  
 
5.9 
 
2005 5.3 266.3  6.7 15.6  
 
3.3 
 
2006 5.8 290.4  8.2 25.9  
 
4.9 
 
2007 6.4 335.7  9.6 29.1  
 
4.6 
 
1) Source : IMF , 2) GDP in brackets denotes negative , 3) Av = Average 
 
3.1.1 Analysis 
 
i) 1998 & 2001 were difficult years. It was observed that there exists a relationship 
between GDP growth and net FDI flows. 1998 was the year Malaysia imposed 
capital controls and pegging the RM to the USD. This withheld repatriation of 
portfolio investments  as certain conditions were to be fulfilled by investors. Thus, 
as a result of foreign investor sentiment and unhappiness of such capital controls, 
net FDI registered a decline to RM10.6 billion (1998) compared to RM19.2 billion 
in 1997. 
 
ii) The fiscal packages implemented were successful in stimulating the lethargic 
economy into “action”, with GDP registering a small growth of 0.5%. GDP 
expanded further by 4.1% in Year 2002. 
 
iii) Of course in  1997/1998 , there were other measures implemented :- 
 
(a) Banking recapitalization  - Danamodal 
 
(b) Divestment of NPLs   - Danaharta 
 
(c) Lending    - Dedicated Funding for SMEs 
 
(d) Interest Rates    - borrowing rates were eased 
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iv) Arising from the above, GDP for 1999 recorded a positive growth of 6.1% 
compared to negative 7.4% in previous year. This is commendable by any 
standards. 
 
3.2 GROWTH (%) IN KEY SECTORS  FROM  1995 TO 2001           
                              
ITEM 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Manufacturing 
 
14.5% 12.2% 10.4% (13.7%) 13.5% 19.1% (5.8%) 4.0% 
Agriculture 
 
1.1% 2.2% 0.4% (4.5%) 3.9% 2.0% (0.9%) 3.0% 
Construction 
 
17.3% 14.2% 10.6% (23.0%) (5.6%) 2.1% 2.3% 1.9% 
Services  
 
9.4% 9.7% 9.9% 0.8% 2.9% 5.7% 5.8% 4.1% 
Consumption: 
Private 
Public 
8.9% 
- 
- 
4.9% 
- 
- 
4.9% 
- 
- 
(10.3%) 
- 
- 
6.1% 
- 
- 
- 
12.5% 
3.0% 
- 
2.8% 
17.6% 
- 
4.4% 
10.8% 
  1) Source : BNM  ; 2) Brackets denote negative  
   
3.2.1 Analysis  
 
i) Due to the time lag , the full impact of the 1997 downturn manifested only in 
1998. With the exception of Services, all other economic activities showed 
declines. Construction  registered a drop of  23.0 %. This sector would see 
recovery only in Year 2000, with growth of 2.1%. 
 
ii) Being a export oriented economy particularly in Electrical & electronics products, 
the manufacturing  sector rebounded a massive 19.1% growth  in 2000. As 
expected, the electronics industry is extremely cyclical and repercussions of 
slowdown will very quickly impact  this sector. 
 
iii) Growth trends for construction activities reveal a time lag for expansionary 
stimulus activities to take effect. This is probably due to levels of bureaucratic 
approvals required in order to start certain projects. Nonetheless, it is normal that 
construction needs a longer gestation period to see results where the benefits are 
really long  term. 
 
  
7 
iv) Of importance is the services sector which was growing at a slower rate. The 
Government is targeting this Sector for growth to prevent the economy from 
contracting further.  
 
 
4.0  YEAR 2008  
 
We shall look at data for the last 3 Quarters and compare the trends : 
 Key Economic Indicators  : 
    
Item 1st Qtr 2008 2nd Qtr 2008 3rd Qtr 2008 
 
GDP (Growth 
%) 
7.1% 6.7% 4.7% 
 
International 
Reserves 
 
RM384.7 billion RM410.9 billion RM379.3 billion 
 
FDI (Net) RM1.4 billion RM8.6 billion RM2.7 billion 
 
Source : BNM  
 
  
 Key Economic Activity : 
 (Growth %) 
Item 1st Qtr 2008 2nd Qtr 2008 3rd Qtr 2008 
 
Domestic 
Demand 
 
10.1 % 8.3% 6.5% 
Manufacturing  
 
6.9% 5.6% 1.8% 
Construction 5.3% 3.9% 1.2% 
 
Agriculture 6.3% 6% 3% 
 
Source : BNM   
 
Analysis :    Trends indicate the various sectors are on rapid contraction especially in 
the 3rd Qtr .The 3 economic sectors of  Manufacturing, Construction and Agriculture 
are core areas with multiplier effects. As such it is appropriate that the Government 
focus on these areas. 
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5.0       RM7 BILLION STIMULUS PACKAGE 
 
Briefly, the money is targeted to be spent as follows:- 
 
RM (billion) Objective /Economic Activity  
 
1.8  Improvement including construction, maintenance and upgrading of 
social infrastructure & public amenities such as – schools; hospitals 
and roads especially in rural areas. 
1.5  An Investment Fund to boost private sector investments with priority 
to high value added strategic sectors and high impact projects 
1.2  Construction of low cost housing 
0.5  Upgrade, repair and maintenance of police, armed forces stations, 
camps and living quarters 
0.5  Improvement and maintenance of public transportation sector e.g. train 
services ( LRT ; KTM Komuter and bus services) 
0.4  Speed up high speed broad band project 
0.3  Skills training programs for tourism, health, construction and business 
process outsourcing 
0.3  Social programs (early education 1-6 yrs old ) eg. Rakan Muda 
0.2  Development of human capital via allocations for youth training by 
private training institutions 
0.2  Rejuvenate viable abandoned housing schemes 
0.1  Small & Medium Scale Enterprises. 
 
Total : RM7 billion  
=============== 
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6.0 MEASUREMENTS 
 
Let us look at results of those past fiscal stimulus measures : 
Year 1997/1998 : 
 
o Pegging of the Ringgit :    
- effectively carried out . 
- control currency outflow  
- stabilize foreign exchange 
- strengthen the Ringgit 
 
o Reduction  of SRR:  
- increase availability of credit at reasonable cost to business community 
- enhance economic production 
- C/A balance in surplus  
 
o Net international Res:  
- increased to RM117.2 billion (1999 )     
- compared to RM99 billion (1998) 
 
o Stimulus package:   
- massive government spending in key economic sectors 
 
Year 2001 : 
 
o External Debt dropped to 55.4% of GDP against 64% at the peak of the Asian 
crisis. 
o Current Account surplus of 8% of GDP  
o Increased expenditure in Human Resource Development, education, training 
and skills development; resulting in continued growth momentum at 5.8% for 
Services. 
o Consumption registered more than 10% growth as a result of tax incentives, 
rebates, reductions in EPF and personal tax.  
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Below is the Table depicting the relationship of GDP growth against Current Account 
Balance from 1995 till 2008 : -  
CA Balance and GDP
-10.0
-8.0
-6.0
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
Year
G
D
P 
(%
 
Ch
an
ge
)
-295
-275
-255
-235
-215
-195
-175
-155
-135
-115
-95
-75
-55
-35
-15
5
25
45
65
CA
 
Ba
la
n
ce
 
(%
 
Ch
an
ge
)
GDP CA Balance
GDP 9.8 10.0 7.3 -7.4 6.1 8.9 0.5 5.4 5.8 6.8 5.3 5.8 6.4 5.8
CA Balance 53.6 -48.4 33.0 -260.6 32.3 32.7 -14.2 10.1 64.6 12.6 34.4 26.2 2.9 -6.8
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 (Oct)
 
  Source  : IMF 
 
      As you can see, the basic ingredient  for revival of the economy is to encourage 
and more importantly ensure spending is continued . The “multiplier “ effect is 
enormous provided strategies were effectively implemented. However, in such times, 
instead of spending further, prudent minded Asians, especially in business as well as 
common folks like you and me, will have a stronger tendency to save (for a rainy 
day!). Thus, the Government also needs to enhance the social safety net to minimize 
such precautionary savings. 
 
      This is where KEYNESIAN theory economics come in. JOHN MAYNARD 
KEYNES , the UK economist, believes that in a slow &  stagnating economy, the 
State has to directly stimulate demand by spending ! The state will need to inject 
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money ( by borrowing, if necessary  ) into public work projects. e.g. build roads, 
bridges, schools, hospitals, and  other infrastructure. 
 
      Economic sectors targeted are similar over the years. These are big ticket items 
and has maximum cascading effects to the economy. For the record, CHINA’s USD 
582 billion  stimulus package is also targeting at the same sectors. Similarly, other 
countries are also engaged in these areas as well. 
 
      Recently, we hear of “intangible  “ infrastructure which was highlighted by the 
incoming US President elect BARACK OBAMA. This so called intangible 
infrastructure is education and healthcare in which human capital comes into play.  
 
      You & I are part of this intangible infrastructure. With your skills and knowledge 
all of you will be the new human resource that the country will need in future. Human 
resource is an important component which cannot be left behind. It is important that 
training must be continuously held as it really takes time to see results. 
   
 
7.0 CONCLUSION 
 
 
Both SRR and OPR were reduced in Year 2008. The RM7 billion stimulus package 
was already announced; and the Government has indicated it would ensure swift 
implementation. However, time is not on our side. Net FDIs had reduced to RM2.7 
billion compared to RM8.6 billion in the 2nd Qtr.  
 
      The Government indicated it will prepare for the worst & would unleash another 
economic package in February 2009 if circumstances warrant. It is understood, 
authorities are closely  monitoring global events. 
 
      Realistic acceptance of the current global scenario is vital to address the attendant 
problems. The government has recognize this and cut GDP growth for Year 2009 to 
3.5% instead of 5.4% forecasted. Thus, the rationale for the measures announced to 
keep the economy ticking.  
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      Though its fundamentals remain strong, the country will still be impacted by the 
global downturn. It has no choice but to ensure continued economic growth via 
expansionary fiscal policy with stimulus packages. Fiscal stimulus is a “sister” 
strategy to monetary policy. Government spending policies influence broad macro-
economic conditions. Notwithstanding these measures, the deficit will creep up to 
4.8% of GDP. 
 
      Recognising the strategy of export-led recovery used in 1997/1998 cannot be 
applied for today’s financial meltdown, because the country’s trading partners are in 
recession, the government has rightly focus on domestic demand and related 
economic activities. Herein is also the reason, why the country should not even 
consider to revert to a low RM/USD regime to export our way out of this global 
downturn. The government has done correctly so far. 
 
      The actions and strategies were set at the “right areas”. However, one concern is 
“leakages”. These can be in the form of further savings, and siphoning of funds (via 
“underground “ banking avenues ) outside the country as happened during the 
previous downturns.  
 
      In the management of this complex global financial tsunami, and to realize the 
objectives in the shortest possible manner, the implementation  of the stimulus 
package demands EFFICIENCY  to achieve  EFFECTIVENESS .   
 
      As the saying goes : IT IS THE END RESULT THAT COUNTS. 
 
      Thank you for your attention. 
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